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Abstract
In 2018, both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK) will mark the 70th anniversary of the establishment of their separate
governments. This is a sad reminder that much remains frozen on the Korean Penin-
sula. For one, families have been separated and communication channels between the
two Korean populations are almost non-existent. Yet, stability is precariously
established by an Armistice that was signed in 1953 and that was never replaced by
a permanent peace mechanism. Moreover, North Korea’s rapid nuclear development
has contributed to tensions and uncertainties, and the Six-Party Talks, originally
designed to ensure the denuclearisation of the peninsula, has been at a standstill for
almost 10 years. The Korean story is thus a prime case to study the dynamics of a
frozen conflict and this article contributes to the existing literature and analysis of
frozen conflicts by suggesting looking at peaceful and violent thawing, as well as
conflict withering. In order to so, the paper focuses on three crucial levels: (1) the micro
level, the impact of the Armistice in light of today’s Koreas as opposed to their status
and standing at the end of the Korean War in 1953, (2) the meso level with geostrategic
concerns concentrated over sectorial policies surrounding the Korean Peninsula in a
globalised world, and (3) the macro level with the changing nature of security gover-
nance. It is argued that in a catch-22 motion, the thread of violent thawing maintains the
conflict in its frozen state.
Introduction
Few places on earth remain as sensitive, exciting, dangerous, and contested as the
Korean Peninsula. For the layperson, the news coming from politicians, the media, and
increasingly exponentially from social media can be troubling: one hears of nuclear
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the imminence of war. For the political scientist, the Korean Peninsula is a fascinating
experiment: Korean people have always had a unified history and longstanding mon-
archy with little political variation. Then, they were annexed and colonised by Japan
and later liberated at the end of the Second World War. Finally, they were separated into
two zones of influence that would eventually develop along different economic,
political, and ideological trajectories. There is thus little doubt that the Korean Penin-
sula is an important case in history, but it also is one that is deeply frustrating to many
observers, as it remains impermeable to most knowledge and theories about people,
governments, and conflicts. In 2003, the year the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK) decided to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, former US
Secretary of Defence William J. Perry noted that though there were clear disagreements
on thematic in both the literature and within policy circles, it was not possible to avoid
talking about the notion of crisis when referring to the Korean situation.1 This was then,
when the DPRK had yet to test its first nuclear weapons. This was then, when both
Koreas had organised family reunions to reconnect some of their oldest people, under
the guidance of Republic of Korea (ROK)’s president and Nobel Peace Prize winner
Kim Dae Jung, the artisan of the Sunshine Policy that was meant to connect and
support the DPRK to aid its development and eventually facilitate reunification. This
was then, when no one expected the DPRK to survive its devastating famine, a
precarious political system, and a collapsing economy.
But this is now, seven decades after the Korean partition, three decades after the end
of the Cold War, and a decade after Pyongyang’s first nuclear test. The scholarship
devoted to understanding the Korean Peninsula, its partition, its dynamics, its problems,
and its future has extensive breadth and depth. It covers amongst others the legacy of
the Korean War (Cumings 1989; Holmes 2006), comparisons between the two Koreas’
political systems (Armstrong 2005; Park 2011; Kim 2004), the question of Korean
national identity and its future (Bleiker 2001; Grzelczyk 2014; Yim 2002), patterns of
interaction and negotiations over the peninsula(Cha and Kang 2003; Snyder 1999),
security partnerships and the balance of power (Smith 2007; Dong 2000), foreign
relations between the Koreas and great powers (Cha 1997), and scenarios for the future
of the peninsula and how to avoid a nuclear holocaust (Bennett 2013; Grinker 1998;
Kwak and Joo 2010).
The DPRK’s obvious endurance and survival have now prompted a change in
scholarship: it is no longer appropriate to speak of an imminent North Korean collapse
as was the case after the end of the Cold War (Harrison 2003; Ford and Kwon 2007). It
also is no longer enough to attribute the Korean crisis to single factors such as the North
Korean leadership, the US’s influence over the region, or China’s quest for rebalancing.
Instead, theoretical creativity is favoured since traditional approaches have not been
able to solve Korean tensions and achieve peace over the peninsula.
It is in this particular direction that this article considers the concept of frozen conflict
as a framework and applies it to the Korean situation. In order to proceed, conflict,
conflict cycles, and rivalries are revisited and applied to the Korean Peninsula tradi-
tionally. Then, it becomes possible to define how frozen conflict is envisioned as an
analytical tool. Finally, the article considers three avenues for analysis: the Korean
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Armistice (micro level), geostrategic changes over the peninsula (meso level), and
evolving security governance commitments and mechanisms affecting actors within the
region (macro level). Thus, this article goes beyond the concepts of peaceful thawing,
violent thawing, and conflict withering presented in the BIntroduction^ to this special
issue by suggesting that a vertical read is necessary: while some layers might indeed
thaw as a result of political change, diplomatic overtures, or even economic pressures,
some layers are not only resistant to change but might even harden and thicken further.
At times, a thaw can also have an unwanted effect as melting ice does not always freeze
back in its previous shape: the recent thaw the world witnessed during the 2018
PyeongChang Olympics games in South Korea with the visit of the North Korean
delegation led by Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong might have renewed hopes of
talks, but it has also raised expectations regarding North Korea’s leadership, thus
changing the original frozen ground parties will most likely return to once the Games
are over. In the context of the Korean Peninsula, we thus suggest that any move toward
more positive transformative scenarios (peaceful thawing or conflict withering) will be
curtailed by the possibility of violent thawing, which in this case is the usage of nuclear
weapons over the peninsula. Yet, the threat of nuclear use is also the very reason why
military intervention on the peninsula has yet to take place.
Intractability and instability on the Korean Peninsula
The roots of instability and conflict on the Korean Peninsula are usually traced to the
Korean division in 1945. They have also been cemented by a bitter war following the
North’s invasion of its southern brother in 1950. When looking at the peninsula under
this particular light, the story of the Korean conflict is one of a common people divided
into two states. It is, in essence, the story of inter-Korean relations and how the two
countries have grown apart from one another, politically, and economically but espe-
cially as people, because of the inability to find a permanent peace solution to replace
the 1953 Armistice. Yet, this only represents a very small part of the Korean story: just
as an iceberg, the roots of instability and conflict on the Korean Peninsula are not about
the Korean division, because this division occurred because of external pressures and
not because of the initial need of a particular group within Korea to secede, for
example. Indeed, the Koreas had always, before their division, existed as one since
the Kingdom of Silla unified the peninsula through its conquest of Baekje and
Goguryeo in the seventh century (Kim 2012).
The Kingdom of Korea’s own history is calm, as only a handful of dynasties
succeeded one another, with its last dynasty, Choseon, in place from 1392 until 1910.
Choseon could have remained a rather anonymous part of the world if not for
geopolitics: trapped between a powerful Chinese empire and a belligerent and
modernising Japan, Korea was a prime location for ship layovers. Foreign interference
from neighbours looking to expand their power forced Choseon to question its own
policies as elites teetered between orthodox voices committed to preserve Korean
customs and traditions and heterodox voices calling for modernization and especially
engagement via open borders (Oberdorfer 2002). But ultimately, Choseon decided to
close itself to foreign influence and this meant that Korea had little opportunities to
learn to understand the international modern world in the twentieth century. When
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Tokyo annexed Seoul in 1910, Korea had thus few if any foreign allies to count on for
support or to ask for help (Choi 1967). The situation was very different at the end of
World War II: the newly created United Nations was ready to spread its wings, and
Allied powers wanted to make sure Japan would not rise again over Asia. As a result,
Korea was now seen as a geopolitical asset that needed to be defended. So, when the
DPRK invaded the ROK in 1950, the United Nations voted to intervene, a first in its
history and only one of two cases of military retaliation with the 1991 Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait. Two years of combat devastated both Koreas and created an international
relations conundrum that still remains nowadays: though it is often assumed that the
Korean War was a conflict between the two Koreas, it was hardly the case since the
United Nations’ forces, while led by the USA and vastly supplied by American
soldiers, were manned by 20 other nations. The Armistice that was signed on 27
July 1953 was thus not a bilateral agreement between the two Koreas. It was instead
signed by the USA on behalf of the United Nations Command, by the Chinese People’s
Volunteer Army and North, and by the DPRK’s own Korean People’s Army. The ROK
is thus only a party to the Armistice by virtue of its participation to the United Nations
Command troop contingent.
The Korean War is an important event in the peninsula’s history since it solidified
the schism that had already started to develop between the two Korean states as they
each elected their own leaders in 1947 and developed their discrete constitutions. Both
countries received extensive help before, during, and after the Korean War, thus making
the Korean conflict an international entanglement. Down south, the USA became
Seoul’s most important economic, political, and military support, as Korea turned into
one of the spokes within the military hub Washington had started to develop in Asia
(Cha 2010). Up north, both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) furnished the DPRK with military equipment and
preferred access to their own economic systems (Ji 2001; Szalontai 2005). Political
shifts during the Cold War and changing military postures and positions meant that any
development on the Korean Peninsula would resonate beyond its borders: tensions
between Pyongyang and Seoul would irremediably involve the USA, often the United
Nations, and quite consistently other regional powers such as Russia, Japan, and China.
By the end of the Cold War, the Korean state of affairs no longer involved finding a
permanent solution to the Armistice since many other crisis erupted in the Armistice’s
wake: these included tensions between Japan and the DPRK (Japanese citizens had
been abducted by Pyongyang in the 1960s and 1970s to serve as language instructors),
terrorist acts committed by Pyongyang onto Seoul (the 1983 Rangoon bombing during
a South Korea visit, the destruction of South Korean flight KAL858 by a North Korean
agent), tensions and confrontations around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) (the 1976
Axe murder attack by North Korean soldiers), or heavy systems confrontations (1996
submarine incident when North Korean intruded into South Korean waters). There are
plenty of conflicting elements present on the Korean Peninsula nowadays, with North
Korea’s development as weapons producer to many countries in the Middle East with
ballistic missiles in the 1980s and 1990s, or Pyongyang’s own nuclear programme
growth, adding even more salt to an already long-seeping wound. What we see through
this brief history overview is a tangled web of events that operate as nested relationship:
according to Michael Howlett (2009), policy elements usually fall within a micro,
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meso, and macro level. This framework will be adapted later in the paper to conduct an
analysis of historical engagements.
But to understand and analyse the Korean Peninsula, both Korean affairs specialists
and the conflict resolution literature are also a cornerstone to understand the Korean
Peninsula. Yet, using the term conflict, or crisis, or tension is far from straightforward,
especially within the Korean context. Charles Hermann (1950) talked about a crisis
requiring elements of threat as well as an element of surprise, along with the fact that
parties only have a short window of opportunity to make a decision about their own
reaction. In that sense, the definition can apply to the Korean Peninsula but there is not
just one crisis in the region. Instead, there are many past, ongoing, and burgeoning
crises. For Ted Robert Gurr (1980), a conflict is different than a crisis as it is composed
of Bovert, coercive interactions of contenting collectivities^. This surely fit the two
Koreas’ state of tensions too, but over time, direct military confrontations have been
rare between the two. Thus, work done on rivalries is particularly useful, especially
those with a dyadic focus: while it is true that the DPRK and the ROK form the most
pertinent dyads on the peninsula because of their history, the DPRK and the US’s
contention over the usage of nuclear energy is a form of dyad and so is the DPRK and
Japan’s contention over the issues of abductees. Diehl and Goertz (2000) have told us
that such rivalries, which they call Benduring^ take time to develop, are linked with
history between the parties and are extremely sensitive to misperceptions, thus easily
fuelling small crises bursts. Some have also suggested the term Bstrategic rivalries^
which also involves states that usually regard each other as competitors (Colaresi and
Thompson 2002). This does appear useful when considering the two Koreas, especially
during the 1950–1970 period when economic competition was fierce between the two
Koreas. Nowadays, it is easy to recognise that capitalism in the South had enabled
Seoul to grow and modernise exponentially. Yet, the DPRK’s development of nuclear
weapons has dealt an unmistakable blow to the ROK, almost rendering its conventional
weapons irrelevant in light of such a potential for fire and fury. But strategic rivalries
usually do not need to experience direct warfare, which appears unsuitable when
considering the devastations that occurred during the Korean War. In that sense, the
absence of open bouts of warfare on the Korean Peninsula creates a puzzle for the
conflict literature since protracted conflict usually requires some period of warfare.
Essentially, the Korean Peninsula might best be described as a region besieged by non-
protracted rivalries.
The Conflict Resolution literature is helpful when it comes to understand how a
conflict or situation such as that of the Korean Peninsula exist and can be dealt with. In
theory, Snyder and Diesing (1977) have suggested that any crisis or conflict can
resemble a form of coercive or accommodative diplomacy that will be influenced by
the fear of potential war. For Charles McClelland (1961), acute international crises
could also be dealt with by seeking outside help such to mediate or broker parties to de-
escalate. In the case of the Korean Peninsula, any resolution would also mean accepting
to engage with the DPRK as a real and legitimate actor. For Fisher et al. (1991), talking
to dangerous actors or Bvillains^ should be done not because it is ethical but because it
is the only way to shift a potential status quo. In practice, many have suggested that the
Korean situation is complex, and that this very complexity leads to suboptimal results:
military, ideological, and economic issues have all mixed to create a heady and
explosive cocktail that lacks a conflict resolution mechanism that can be enacted and
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enforced (Smith 2000). Three directions have particularly been investigated: negotia-
tion strategies, goal divergence, and evolving environment.
Negotiation strategies are problematic, especially when it comes to dealing with
Pyongyang as the DPRK has had the habit, ever since the Armistice negotiations, to
practice agenda meddling and has often reinterpreted agreements after their signature
(Joy 1955; Downs 1999). When the two Koreas talked to one another, they often have
done so away from the negotiation table where the DPRK also tend to purse a different
agenda than what is expected during formal rounds (do Kim and Hoon 1995). Parties
also have divergent goals, with one of the main issues surrounding what the interna-
tional community wants the DPRK to become or not to become. Giving Pyongyang
survival assurances has thus not been a priority and has largely contributed to insecurity
over the peninsula (Kleiner 2005). A large focus has also been to sort problems (such as
nuclear proliferation) but at the same time re-creating diplomatic ties between the
DPRK and the USA, Japan, and the ROK especially (Yun 2005). Yet, these approaches
have often been considered in a vacuum, away from the changing realities of the
Korean Peninsula. Some noted for many years that North Korean provocations were
often short of war, and that Pyongyang had shifted from a wish to unify the Korean
Peninsula under its leadership to a strategy of economic survival away from the South
(Cha and Kang 2003). While on the one hand the DPRK has been noted as reverting to
a military-first policy (French 2005), nuclear proliferation has on the other hand clearly
been noted as a way to survive and not a suicide mission (Sagan 1996). This means,
essentially, that the ice is changing: while there is no war, the peninsula grounds are
different every time the DPRK test a weapon, and it is unhelpful to pigeonhole the
DPRK in a specific role, as they evolve as well (Smith 2000). Is there anything to be
gained by applying this analytical lens to the Korean situation?
Frozen conflict lens: questioning the Korean situation
A frozen conflict starts with an actual war and results in a situation that is neither war
nor peace. Frozen conflicts are usually understood within a post-Soviet context and
thus often centre on Eurasian countries. Frozen conflicts often involved great powers.
Though frozenness conjures images of immobility, this actually might be a misnomer:
events do occur, and dynamic interactions are possible, even though no permanent
peaceful solution has been found after fighting has subsided (Lynch 2005). This also
means a strong potential for violence resurgence as according to for Valery Perry,
violence might have indeed stopped, but Bthe underlying interests of the formerly
warring parties have neither been abated nor addressed^ (Perry 2009, p. 36).
Within the framework of this Special Issue, frozen conflict is defined as a protracted
and post-war conflict process that has failed to reach a peaceful and stable stage
between contending actors. Jan Ludvik and Michal Smetana particularly focus on three
transformative scenarios, peaceful thwarting, violent thawing, and conflict withering,
but they stress that conflict transformation is very elusive: more often than not, parties
return to a state of frozen affairs. The Korean Peninsula is a particularly salient case
study for the furthering of the frozen conflict field. Indeed, though frozen conflicts have
usually been understood within European and Eurasian contexts, the post-Soviet
paradigm is central to the Korean division and current difficulties. Soviet influence
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over the Korean Peninsula both in terms of Soviet influence onto the DPRK as early as
the 1950s and the ensuing Cold War context that framed more of the geopolitical
context up to the Cold War’s end is important. The role great powers take within a
particular conflict and whether or not they are aiding or trying to prevent conflict
transformation is also a crucial point to consider. Moreover, the Armistice embodies a
halted conflict, a temporary measure meant to allow for space and appropriate time to
reconcile both Koreas to the reality of their division and find a permanent solution to
accommodate their divergences. What the Armistice has done, however, is stop
violence, at least temporarily. The frozen conflict lens is also useful to consider in the
Korean case because of the notion of the underlying interests: as mentioned earlier,
though the Koreas exist today in separate states because of the initial Korean Peninsula
division to remove the remnants of Japanese colonial endeavours at the end of World
War II, their separation is far from being the only issue that needs to be resolved.
Hence, questions of human rights, regional stability, and potential presence of nuclear
weapons that could lead to new warfare all simmer in the background.
How can frozen conflicts evolve? This article focuses on three transformative
scenarios: peaceful thawing, violent thawing, and conflict withering. The first one,
(1) peaceful thawing, suggests that it is possible for a conflict to evolve so that only a
stable peace remains. In order to do so, diplomacy and negotiations are usually
favoured, with parties engaging in discussions about what has made them at odds with
one another. There also is scope for non-state actors such as NGOs and IGOs to assist
in conflict transformation. The second one, (2) violent thawing, sees the opposite
motion, one where a frozen conflict to return to a state of violent and major warfare.
The third one, (3) conflict withering, sees the conflict disappear not because of
conscious efforts to manage it and find a peaceful solution through negotiated efforts
but rather because of changing circumstances such as economic upturns or downturns,
for example. All three options are highly relevant to the Korean Peninsula. When
considered alongside events that have shaped the direction of Korean affairs since, in
1945, they allow for a new and different understanding and interpretation of conflict in
the Korean context:
1. With regard to peaceful thawing, one of the root causes to the current situation is
the Armistice: the negotiation of a peaceful military settlement would remove an
important hurdle to the normalisation of the situation in the region. Security
governance changes, however, could also be considered under this particular
outlook, with negotiated solutions brokered within bespoke endeavours such as
the Six-Party Talks.
2. Violent thawing is the option that is currently the most feared, especially in light of
the DPRK’s military arsenal. Yet, the very presence of nuclear weapons on the
Korean Peninsula acts as a potential deterrent. Thus, violent thawing within the
Korean context would most likely lead to questions regarding security governance.
This mostly means shifting alliances and defence commitments in light of military
development.
3. Conflict withering would occur within the context of gains derived from interde-
pendence for example and would thus largely rely on the nature of the North
Korean regime to change fundamentally, yet gradually so as not lead to violent
thawing. Thus, conflict withering within the Korean context would most likely
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involve a change from a totalitarian North Korean state to one that opens up
because of the imperatives of economic factors and one that allows for changes
to happen.
Moving past frozen land: what matters on the peninsula?
While the Korean Peninsula has been under scrutiny for many years by researchers and
policy-makers, and a multitude of angles and lenses have been applied to understand
mechanisms, patterns, approaches, and prospects, the starting point to much of the
contemporary study of the Koreas is about the very existence of the Armistice and its
legal implications. The Armistice is contentious because of who is a party to it: the
actual signatories are the United Nations Command, the DPRK, and the PRC, which
means that neither the ROK nor the USA are directly involved, though their engage-
ment is obvious given the US’s military situation and South Korea’s location (Yong-
Joong 2002). Despite these issues, it is undeniable that had a peaceful and permanent
solution be found to end the KoreanWar, a number of security conundrums would have
also been resolved. For one, the two Koreas would not have had to defend their own
existences as legitimate entities in the region as well as within the international
community. Their own security needs might not have involved and entangled as many
large powers as they did within the Cold War context.
Yet, most of the Korean Peninsula’s issues now involve security needs, which have
been greatly accelerated by the DPRK’s development of nuclear energy and its attempts
to secure a nuclear weapons arsenal that could act as a deterrent to what Pyongyang
perceives is belligerent posturing from the USA. In parallel to these issues, most of the
peninsula has slowly entered interdependent patterns via the Koreas’ 1991 member-
ships to the United Nations and their participation in a number of international
organisations. The Korean conflict has also been transformed from mostly bilateral
engagements to engagements via multilateral frameworks, a change that has simply
followed most of the negotiation development because of globalisation forces, actor
diversification, and the need to manage complexity via plural processes. Though
Northeast Asia has often suffered from an Borganisational gap^ and has lagged behind
other parts of the world, including Europe when it comes to multilateral processes
(Calder and Ye 2004), the Korean conundrum has led to the development of bespoke
processes as well as the Four-Party Talks (ROK, DPRK, PRC, and USA to attempt to
replace the Armistice), the 1994 Agreed Framework (an international consortium to
replace the DPRK’s nuclear reactors with light-water reactors and to prevent dual-use
and nuclear proliferation), the Six-Party Talks (ROK, DPRK, PRC, USA, Japan, and
Russia to achieve the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula), as well as other
dialogues such as via the Red Cross to deal with the issues of Japanese citizens
abducted by the DPRK. To make sense of these historic events, we go back to
Howlett’s three policy levels and adapt here to essential time markers on the Korean
Peninsula. The timeline compiled here is made of data reporting the major clashes,
events, overtures, and policy decisions that have shaped the Korean conflict. Hence, it
is possible to present a reading of the Korean Peninsula’s major events since the Korean
War until contemporary times, organised chronologically but also thematically along
three levers:
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– The micro level, which focuses on policy actors’ behaviour, finds its start with the
political situation set up by the Armistice. Events tagged into this category pertain
to clashes between the two Koreas and policy decisions geared toward this
significant other.
– The meso level, which focuses on sectorial policy regimes. Events tagged into this
category pertain to specific geostrategic consideration involving the Korean Pen-
insula and outside actors but mostly in a bilateral capability.
– The macro level, which focuses on global security governance. Events tagged into
this category pertain to non-proliferation regimes such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency’s efforts toward non-proliferation on the peninsula or other United
Nations’ vehicles including sanctions.
This analysis has the advantage of considering several levels of interaction instead of
focusing on more isolated and increasingly contested explanations to the Korean
conflict lasting this long, such as the fact that the DPRK is about to collapse, the fact
that China is the only power enabling the DPRK’s survival, or the fact that the DPRK is
a clear, present, and imminent danger to the USA (Table 1).
Even though the Korean War and the subsequent Armistice have left the Korean
Peninsula in a relative state of tension, a number of other factors, such as North Korea’s
pursuit of nuclear weapons and the entanglement of foreign powers such as the USA in
bilateral Korean affairs (at times at the request of both Korean states, however), means
that the types of conflict and crisis we see are of a Bmultidimensional nature^ and have,
as Hazel Smith (2005) has mentioned, numerous times, short, medium, and long-term
regional stability issues.
The frozen conflict lens is useful here to chisel a reading that concentrates on how
core issues between opposing sides might remain unresolved. It allows for contentious
dyads of a wide range of issues, such as inter-Korean relation problems, or the US-
DPRK rhetoric and sanction relationship. The expectation to move beyond the frozen
state would be that peaceful thawing, through a mix of negotiated compromises
between parties (sometimes even third parties such as states, IGOs, and NGOs), would
have been successful by now. Issues centred on at the micro, as showed in the table,
were particularly concentrated in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. They have shifted to be
encompassed in geopolitical layers as time went on, and issues were often packaged
together to try to find a potential solution. However, with the development of North
Korea’s missile programme, and the start of its nuclear tests, most of the interactions
that we now see are about the meso level and involves infighting and instability with
countries and entities beyond the peninsula. The uncertainty surrounding North Korea’s
missile and nuclear tests and capabilities also creates opportunities for violent thawing:
The USA has considered pre-emptive strikes and military actions over the peninsula
should Pyongyang decide to further its capabilities or even launch an actual bomb.
Violent thawing is a very unlikely option on the Korean Peninsula given some of the
geostrategic changes that have occurred over the past decades: the ROK has become a
very strong and courted economy, and the USA is also extremely reliant on the PRC for
its own economic consumption and growth, and global governance as the macro level,
as shown in the table, is very present on the questions of sanctioning the DPRK or
considering ways to restart negotiations.. But change in the arrangements we see in
Northeast Asia could potentially be devastating for world economic balance, while a
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Table 1 Major events over the Korean Peninsula (1950–2018)
Year Event Levels
Micro Meso Macro
1950 June: DPRK invades ROK ✓
1953 July: Armistice signed between PRC’s People’s Volunteers’ Army, DPRK
Korean People’s Army, and UN Command
✓
1956 February: DPRK highjacks ROK commercial plane on Busan-Seoul route, 8
abducted to DPRK
✓
1965 April: US reconnaissance plane attacked by DPRK ✓
1968 January: US Pueblo intelligence boat seized by DPRK ✓
January: DPRK launches commando to assassinate ROK president ✓
1969 April: US reconnaissance plane shot down by DPRK ✓
September: 4 US soldiers shot in DMZ ✓
1969 April: US reconnaissance plane shot down by DPRK ✓
1970 June: DPRK seizes ROK broadcast vessel ✓
1974 February: DPRK sinks 2 ROK fishing boats ✓
February: DPRK agent assassinates ROK first lady ✓
1976 August: 2 US soldiers killed with axes at DMZ ✓
1980 March: 1 DPRK citizen killed while crossing into South Korea ✓
1981 July: 3 DPRK citizens killed crossing Imjin River ✓
1983 August: DPRK bombing of ROK delegation in Rangoon killing 21 people ✓
1985 December: DPRK joints the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ✓
1987 November: DPRK bombs ROK Korean Airline flight 858, killing 115 people ✓
1991 September: DPRK and ROK become United Nations members ✓
December: DPRK and ROK sign North-South declaration for denuclearization
of peninsula
✓
1992 March: US imposes sanctions on DPRK for missile proliferation activities ✓
July: 1 DPRK citizen killed in Cheolwon ✓
1994 October: Agreed Framework signed ✓
December: US army helicopter downed in DPRK ✓
1995 May: DPRK kills 3 ROK citizens on a fishing boat ✓
1996 May: US imposes sanctions on DPRK for missile technology-related transfers ✓
September: DPRK submarine runs aground on ROK shore ✓
1997 June: 3 DPRK boats cross into ROK waters, ROK captures DPRK submarine ✓
August: US imposes sanctions on DPRK for missile proliferation activities ✓
1998 January: UN sends food aid to DPRK to alleviate famine ✓
June: ROK captures DPRK submarine in its waters ✓
August: DPRK sends rocket over Japan ✓
2000 April: US imposes sanctions on DPRK for missile technology development ✓
June: DPRK and ROK leaders meet in Pyongyang ✓
June: US partially lifts economic sanctions on DPRK ✓
June: Naval clash between DPRK and ROK ✓
2001 January: US imposes sanctions on DPRK for missile technology development ✓





2002 January: US singles out DPRK in Axis of Evil Speech ✓
February: DPRK reactivates Yongbyon reactor
August: US imposes sanctions on DPRK for missile technology development ✓
December: US halts oil shipments to DPRK ✓
December: IAEA inspectors kicked out of DPRK ✓
2003 January: DPRK withdraws from NPT ✓
March: US imposes sanctions on DPRK for missile technology development ✓
July: ROK halts food and fertiliser aid to DPRK ✓
2005 September: DPRK agrees within the Six-Party Talks process to give up nuclear
weapons in order to receive aid
✓
2006 October: DPRK conducts a nuclear test ✓
2007 June: IAEA verifies DPRK Yongbyon shutdown ✓
February: DPRK agrees within the Six-Party Talks to close its nuclear reactor
in exchange for fuel
✓
October: DPRK agrees within the Six-Party Talks to halt its nuclear develop-
ment
✓
November: DPRK and ROK prime ministers meet ✓
2008 February: New York Philharmonic Orchestra plays in DPRK ✓
June: US lifts sanctions imposed on the DPRK after the 2006 nuclear test ✓
October: The US removes the DPRK form its list of state sponsor of terrorism ✓
July: A ROK woman is shot while visiting Mt. Gumgang in the DPRK ✓
October: DPRK tests a short-range missile ✓
2009 June: UN imposes sanctions on the DPRK (Res 1874) ✓
June: DPRK sentences 2 US journalist to prison ✓
April: DPRK launches rocket ✓
May: DPRK conducts a nuclear test ✓
2010 March: DPRK sinks ROK ship Cheonan ✓
May: Hot line in Panmunjeom closed ✓
July: US imposes sanctions on DPRK for Cheonan sinking ✓
November: DPRK shells ROK Yeonpyeong Island ✓
2011 January: Hot line in Panmunjeom reopened ✓
2012 April: DPRK tests rocket ✓
December: DPRK launches rocket, and satellite into orbit ✓
2013 February: DPRK tests nuclear weapon ✓
April: DPRK shuts down Kaesong economic zone ✓
September: DPRK reopens Kaesong ✓
April: DPRK restarts Yongbyon reactor ✓
May: DPRK conducts 4 short-range missile tests ✓
2014 January: UN imposes sanctions on DPRK (Res 2087) ✓
March: UN imposes sanctions on DPRK(Res 2094) ✓
March: DPRK tests 2 Nodong Ballistic missile ✓
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war would of course have an even more tragic human impact. In a catch-22 situation, it
is the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons and its persistence in testing them that
create the possibility and the need for violent thawing via either foreign military action
or potential misunderstanding and miscommunication between various actors. Yet, it is
the very fact that the DPRK has managed to develop nuclear weapons that prevents
other countries from launching a military action on the North. Violent thawing is to be
seen here as a by-product of geostrategic Cold War rivalries.
As for conflict withering, there are very few avenues for this to be realised: it would
take specific changes such as the DPRK slowly opening its economy up to a point
where it is no longer seeking drastic measures to survive. Thus, another catch-22 is
unveiled here: it is the potentiality of a violent thawing via military conflict that
prevents avenues for conflict withering from materialising. Hence, at the macro level,
the international sanctions directed at the DPRK have slowly curtailed not only North
Korean revenue streams but also potential development and opportunities for in-depth
change. For example, sanctions now severely impact education in the DPRK, espe-
cially foreign endeavours to teach business practices and rudimentary capitalism in





2015 February: DPRK tests 5 short-range ballistic missiles ✓
December: US imposes sanctions on DPRK over weapons proliferation ✓
2016 January: DPRK tests hydrogen bomb ✓
April: DPRK tests intermediate-range ballistic missile ✓
June: DPRK tests 2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles ✓
August: DPRK fires medium-range ballistic missiles toward Japan ✓
September: DPRK conducts a nuclear test ✓
November: UN imposes new sanctions on DPRK (Res 2321) ✓
2017 February: DPRK tests new ballistic missile ✓
March: DPRK launches 4 ballistic missiles toward Japan ✓
May: DPRK tests an intermediate-range ballistic missile ✓
June: US imposes sanctions on DPRK for missile technology development ✓
July: DPRK tests long-range missile into Sea of Japan ✓
August: DPRK tests missile over Japan ✓
August: UN imposes new sanctions on DPRK (Res 2371) ✓
September: UN imposes new sanctions on DPRK (Res 2375) ✓
November: DPRK launches intercontinental ballistic missile toward Japan ✓
December: UN imposes new sanctions on DPRK (Res 2397) ✓
Source: Compiled by author using public domain resources
V. Grzelczyk
Conclusion
There is no shortage of analysis, explanations, and opinions about the Korean Penin-
sula. Yet, decades of scholarship and political practice have not managed to curtail
uncertainties in the region. If anything, we now live in more dangerous times as the
DPRK has managed to develop nuclear weapons, thus becoming one more country in
the international community that has the possibility to destroy a large part of humanity.
Despite this pessimistic approach, many remain confident that a peaceful transforma-
tive scenario can be found on the peninsula. But perhaps, the best sign that the world is
not on the brink of war is that as long as both Koreas have existed in their modern
forms, the international community and especially large powers have taken an interest
in making sure a stalemate is achieved. Whether or not such as interest is motivated by
personal greed or personal empathy is not what is at stake here. What is crucial,
however, is that there has been much investment in making sure the Korean Peninsula
can growth and prosper, at least South of the DMZ. Applying the concept of frozen
conflict to the Korean conundrum, and indeed presenting such a conundrum as being
rightfully part of the corpus of frozen conflict case, is useful, as it allows to read conflict
on the peninsula in a different light, once that allows less focus on one particular actor
or theme but more of a layered approach to difficult positions and propositions.
This article has focused on reading the Korean conflict through three layers:
conditions that pertain to the Armistice, changes within the geostrategic nature of the
Korean Peninsula especially in light of globalisation and interdependence, and Defence
matters especially given the DPRK’s nuclear development and accelerated missile
development programme. This was then coupled with three potential transformation
scenarios: peaceful thawing that would occur through mediation, negotiation, and
multilateral channels, violent thawing that would lead to change but via the devastating
restart of open warfare, and conflict withering that would see change because it is
unavoidable and inherent after an appropriate amount of time. The frozen conflict lens
is particularly appropriate to the Korean case since it is largely composed of rivalries
and contentious sides (between countries for example), and it also allows for the
involvement of many types of actors. What we find to be most salient here is that at
this point, the situation has reached a Bprecarious instability^ by which the fear of use
of nuclear weapons and the restart of a war actually paralyses much of the situation
from thawing peacefully. So, there might be some thawing, but it does not always mean
that the situation returns to what it was before the layer of ice was created, since
countries and situations remain dynamic. This is exemplified by the fact that if a peace
treaty were to be signed between the Koreas, this would most likely mean that both
Koreas would still exist as separate and not return to a unified pre-World War II Korea
situation. Moreover, it is quite likely that the DPRK would have more of a military
might than the ROK. What, then, can we expect to see, and what would be most
advisable? In a perfect world, conflict withering would eventually occur and the
reasons why belligerence was so deeply rooted would just erode. In a more realistic
world, peaceful thawing would need to be pursued with the caveat that both Koreas’
grievances and needs must be met however difficult this might be given domestic
regime constraints.
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